### Antiblackness

#### LAWs consolidate anti-blackness through algorithms that perpetuate violence on black people AND forced experimentation on black women for the sake of scientific advancement BOTH of which are potential advantages

Ramsay-Jones 19 (Hayley Ramsay-Jones, Soka Gakkai International, member of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, October 17, 2019, “Racism and Fully Autonomous Weapons,” UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, workshop on the impact of new information technologies on racial equality, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Racism/SR/Call/campaigntostopkillerrobots.pdf>) nihara

Introduction

The rise of artificial intelligence is largely due to an increase in power, memory and speed of computers, and the availability of large quantities of data about many aspects of our lives.i Through the commercial application of big-data, we are increasingly being sorted into different classifications and stereotypes. In its most benign form, this stereotyping is being used to sell us products via targeted advertising, however, in its most egregious application, we see the weaponization of new information technologies utilize similar classifications based on biased algorithms, to which the consequences for certain communities could be deadly. In this paper I focus on fully autonomous weapons that are currently being developed for military and law enforcement purposes; and their potential threat to the human rights of marginalized communities, in particular persons of color intersectionally ii . This paper will also consider the systemic nature of racism and how racism would be reinforced and perpetuated by fully autonomous weapons.

Racism in Artificial Intelligence

Fully autonomous weapons can select and attack targets without meaningful human control, they operate based on algorithms and data analysis programming. In essence, this means that machines would have the power to make life-and-death decisions over human beings.

The trend towards more autonomy in weaponry without adequate human oversight is alarming especially when we know that digital technologies are not racially neutral. Moreover, when it comes to artificial intelligence (AI) there is an increasing body of evidence that shows that racism operates at every level of the design process and continues to emerge in the production, implementation, distribution and regulation. In this regard AI not only embodies the values and beliefs of the society or individuals that produce them but acts to amplify these biases and the power disparities.iii

One example of racism manifesting in AI is the under-representation problem in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields, which in itself is a manifestation of structural racism and patriarchy in western society. Technologies in the west are mostly developed by white males, and thus perform better for this group. A 2010 studyiv by researchers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the University of Texas, found that algorithms designed and tested in East Asia are better at recognizing East Asians, while those designed in Western countries are more accurate at detecting Caucasians. Similarly, sound detecting devices perform better at detecting male, Anglo-American voices and accents, as opposed to female voices, and non-Anglo-American accents.

Research by Joy Buolamwini,v reveals that race, skin tone and gender are significant when it comes to facial recognition. Buolamwini demonstrates that facial recognition software recognizes male faces far more accurately than female faces, especially when these faces are white. For darker-skinned people however the error rates were over 19%, and unsurprisingly the systems performed especially badly when presented with the intersection between race and gender, evidenced by a 34.4% error margin when recognizing dark-skinned women.

Despite the concerning error rates in these systems, commercially we already see adaptations of faulty facial recognition systems being rolled out in a variety of ways from soap dispensers to self-driving cars. The issue here is what happens if law enforcement and national security become reliant on a system that can recognize white males with just 1% error rate yet fails to recognize dark-skinned women more than one-third of the time?

These types of applications of new information technology fail people of color intersectionally at a disturbing rate. The fact that these systems are commercially available reveals a blatant disregard for people of color, it also positions "whiteness"vi as the norm, the standard for objectivity and reason. These applications of new information technology including their weaponization favors whiteness at the expense of all others, it is not merely a disempowerment but an empowerment. In real terms, racism bolsters white people's life chances. vii

As we all grew up in a white-dominated world it is not surprising that the vast majority of white people operate within, benefit from and reproduce a system that they barely notice. This is a long-held reality and it is a fundamental problem that we now see infiltrate technology.

Historical or latent bias in data is another issue, this is created by frequency of occurrence, for example in 2016 an MBA student named Rosaliaviii discovered that googling "unprofessional hairstyles for work" yielded images of mainly black women with afro-Caribbean hair, conversely when she searched "professional hair" images of mostly coiffed white women emerged, similar google search results are still seen today. This is due to machine learning – algorithms; it collects the most frequently submitted entries and therefore reflects statistically popular racists sentiments. These learnt biases are further strengthened, thus racism continues to be reinforced.

A more perilous example of this is in data-driven, predictive policing that uses crime statistics to identify "high crime" areas and then subjects these areas to higher and often more aggressive levels of policing. Crime happens everywhere, however when an area is over-policed such as communities of color that results in more people of color being arrested and flagged as "persons of interest" thus the cycle continues. In 2017, Amnesty International launched a report called "trapped in the Matrix",ix the report highlighted racially discriminatory practices by the UK police force and their use of a database called the "Gangs Matrix" which inputs data on "suspected" gang members in London. As of October 2017, there were 3,806 people on the Matrix, 87% of those are from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds and 78% are black, a disproportionate number given that the police's own figures show that only 27% of those responsible for serious youth violence are black.

Amnesty stated that some police officers in the UK have been acting like they are in the "Wild West", making false assumptions about people based on their race, gender, age and socioeconomic status. As a result, individuals on the Matrix database are subject to chronic over-policing. With black people six times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people, and ten times more likely to be convicted of drug-related offenses. This system not only interferes with their right to privacy, Amnesty claims that the police often share the Matrix with other local agencies such as job centers, housing associations, social services, schools and colleges. In several cases, this has led to devastating impacts on people's social and economic lives because they are listed as "nominal" gang members, a label which is deliberately vague and stigmatizing.

The nature of systemic racism means that it is embedded in all areas of society, the effects of this type of oppression doesn't easily dissipate. Through the continual criminalization and stigmatization of people of color, systemic racism operates by creating winners and losers regardless of what people actually do. This is also the way that it redistributes opportunities and resources based on nothing other than privilege.

Given that the UK, as well as five other countriesx are developing fully autonomous weapons to target, injure and kill based on data-inputs and pre-programmed algorithms, we can see how long-standing inherent biases, pose an ethical and human rights threat. Where some groups of people will be vastly more vulnerable than others, fully autonomous weapons would not only act to further entrench already existing inequalities but could exacerbate them and lead to deadly consequences.

Legalities

As AI technology advances, the question of who will be held accountable for human rights abuses is becoming increasingly urgent. Machine learning and AI, effect a range of human rights including privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the right to non-discrimination and equality, the right to life and the right to human dignity.

Holding those responsible for the unlawful killings of people of color by law enforcement and the military is already a huge challenge in many countries, however, this issue would be further impaired if the unlawful killing was committed by a fully autonomous weapon. Who would be held responsible: the programmer, manufacturer, commanding officer, or the machine itself? Lethal force by these weapons would make it even easier for people of color to be at the mercy of unlawful killings and far more difficult to obtain justice for victims of color and their families.

Conclusion

According to Reni Eddo-Lodge racism perpetuates partly through malice, carelessness and ignorance, it acts to quietly assist some, while hindering others.xi It is within this framework that we must grapple with race and the weaponization of new information technologies. In this regard, we should ask ourselves who controls these technologies and what do they think they know about the people they are "classifying"? What are the politics of these relationships and the deeply-rooted systemic forms of discrimination? Who benefits from these technologies and how?

There is a long history of people of color being experimented on for the sake of scientific advances from which they have suffered greatly but do not benefit. An example of this is from James Marion Sims, known as the father of gynecology for reducing maternal death rates in the US, in the 19th century. He conducted his research by performing painful and grotesque experiments on enslaved black women. "All of the early important reproductive health advances were devised by perfecting experiments on black women,".xii Today, the maternal death rate for black women in the US is three times higher than it is for white women.

Thus, when it comes to new information technology, facial recognition systems, algorithms and automated and interactive machine decision-making, communities of color are often both deprived of their benefits and subjected to their consequences. This paradox where science is inflicted on communities of color rather than aided by it must be addressed.

We must be vigilant against deeply rooted social problems taking root in the technical infrastructure that we create. We must work towards a zero policy on racism in technology, and not weaponize racism in technology. If racism and killer robots are allowed to co-exists these weapons will be used discriminately against people of color and other marginalized groups.

For these and many other ethical, moral, human rights, legal and humanitarian reasons the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, numerous governments, regional groups, tech workers, experts, scholars and the UN Secretary-General are all calling for a legally binding instrument to prohibit fully autonomous weapons. xiii

We call on the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance to condemn fully autonomous weapons and the human rights threat they pose to people of color; and to support a prohibition treaty that will preserve meaningful human control over the use of force and prohibit fully autonomous weapons. xiv

### Bronze Knight

#### Building stacks through cooperating with NATO allows for open sourcing that provides better public benefits.

**New America**, **ND**, "The Digital Government Mapping Project," https://www.newamerica.org/digital-impact-governance-initiative/reports/digital-government-mapping-project/10-principles-for-building-a-digital-government-stack/

1. Modularity

While a handful of countries have built impressive, tightly integrated digital stacks, these outliers are the exception rather than the rule. Both technically and politically, it is usually easier and less expensive to create smaller solutions that can be easily reconfigured and optimized as circumstances change. Just like a set of Legos, modular platforms can be reassembled to address needs and opportunities that may not have been anticipated when they were first created.

UK Notify demonstrates these benefits. After the solution was initially deployed in the UK, it was adapted to meet new challenges by the Australian Digital Transformation Agency, the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, and the Canadian Digital Service. Along the way, the system developed new capabilities. For example, Canadian engineers added French language support to the original tool. Doing so not only fulfilled a national mandate to make the software available in French and English, but also provided new functionality that the UK and French-speaking communities might be able to draw on in the future. The flexibility of modular solutions is a huge advantage at a time when technology and public needs are both evolving rapidly.

2. Open Source

Most of the work performed by governments is similar regardless of whether it is in New York, New Delhi, or Freetown. Almost all governments have to provide public benefits and services, collect taxes, maintain registries, and carry out a pretty well-defined set of other responsibilities that could be streamlined using technology. As the example above illustrates, governments are slowly waking up to the opportunity to develop and share open source solutions to power the public sector rather than building duplicative solutions of varying quality. Along with modular design, **open source development can help governments cooperate to develop best-in-class solutions, adapt them to meet their own needs, and quickly scale them across borders to benefit other communities at minimal extra cost.**

One of the benefits of open source development is that it allows civil society **to examine the systems governments implement and point out design flaws, security risks, and threats to privacy and civil rights**. A contact tracing app deployed in India was found to have numerous security bugs and led public authorities to open source the code for additional review by the global security community. Since then, hundreds of security flaws have been identified and fixed thanks to the power of crowdsourced engineering talent made possible by open source. DIGI’s Building and Reusing Open Source Tools in Government report provides a guide for how open source solutions can foster innovation in the public sector.

### Fem IR

#### The United States federal government should increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by integrating embodied data in the area of artificial intelligence in military logistics projects.

#### Vulnerability and corporeal practices are deployed within practices of power and within fixed lines---The TVA Solves

Väyrynen, 2019. Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” Peacebuilding, 7:2, 146-159, //barn

Choreographies do not happen in a vacuum: they are enacted in the corporeal practices people deploy in the everyday to form and maintain movement within practices of power. For the actors, then, choreographies are always partially pre-given, already planned and presented as fixed lines to be followed – yet the interactional resources of bodies can be used to remould the situation, as my vignettes demonstrate. Looking closer at these everyday techniques of interaction reveals that choreographies are in fact open to surprises and even disturbances, and tend to produce extraordinary acts out of the ordinary.57

Because the everyday is made and remade thorough the changing positions and relations of bodies, choreographies are always situationally enacted in events. As such, choreography allows, in my view, the study of embodied micro-practices of peace. In short, the immediacy of the everyday and its encounters, as well as their relevance for peace, calls for the analysis of events and their corporeal choreographies where acknowledgement and recognition emerge. This ‘corporeal turn’ in peace thinking points research towards events and processes that are marked by their mundaneness and ordinariness – their everydayness – as well as towards embodied data collected from multiple sources.

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by \*covertly\* subjecting all new cybersecurity standards to a gender impact assessment

Millar et al 21 Dr. Katharine Millar (Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and holds a doctoral degree from the University of Oxford, United Kingdom. Her research interests lie in the relationship between gender, sexuality, politics and violence. Her current research examines gender and cybersecurity; gender, race, militarism, and contemporary populism(s)) et al, 2021, " Gender approaches to cybersecurity: design, defence and response," United Nations Institution for Disarmament Research, https://s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/igc-production/5VmjuiWvoa7oVEK1Y2ErHT4HxYMu2lUJ.pdf

3.3 Recommendations » International standards organizations, in cooperation with national standards bodies, should identify, and collect data on, the areas where cybersecurity standards have gender effects. » Based on data collection and analysis, current cybersecurity standards should be revised in a gender-sensitive and gender-responsive manner. » All proposed new cybersecurity standards should be subject to a **gender impact assessment** to ensure gender sensitivity and gender responsiveness. Practitioners should be given gender and cybersecurity training to support them in conducting these assessments. 25 GENDER APPROACHES TO CYBERSECURITY » International standards organizations and national standards bodies should ensure that all working groups developing cybersecurity standards have gender and intersectional equality experts. » International standards organizations and national standards bodies should ensure diverse gender representation in cybersecurity standardmaking processes, in stakeholder consultations and within standards organizations.

### Imperialism

#### Solves the AFF. Historical Bans have decreased imperial military power.

Garcia, 12 [Denise Garcia is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Northeastern University, 2012, accessed on 7-18-2022, Cornell International Affairs Review, "Banning Evil: Cluster Munitions and the Successful Formation of a Global Prohibition Regime", http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1244/banning-evil-cluster-munitions-and-the-successful-formation-of-a-global-prohibition-regime]/ISEE

Cluster munitions constitute a substantial part of the military arsenals of all major powers. Their development, procurement and stockpile are a central hard component of national security. Yet, in less than two years, cluster munitions were banned by an international treaty negotiated outside the normal channels, the United Nations (UN), and spectacularly, in less than two years. The treaty is the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) signed in Oslo in December 2008, by almost one hundred states, and quickly enforced force (August 2010). Realists would dismiss such cases and say that the politics of national security is impervious to change and influence. A few prominent scholars have demonstrated the role of other actors beyond the state in bringing change to other issues that are close to the national security of states. The case of the powerful convention that banned landmines in 1997 proved to be the first hard case in which an issue of national security was brought to change by the penetrating and coordinated influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) worldwide. Differently from landmines, cluster munitions are a highly profitable industry and have a vital place in the military doctrines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and others. One element that fundamentally differentiates landmines from cluster munitions is economic. The latter are much more costly to produce and the trade is substantially more profitable. A major part of global artillery arsenals is made up of cluster bombs. Eighty per cent of United States (US) artillery ammunition, for instance, consists of such munitions. Russia, China and the US are the biggest producers. Marchers at the May 2008 Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions Marchers at the May 2008 Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions I argue that the ban on cluster munitions was brought to life by a stout global prohibition regime by a more complex set of arrangements and coalitions than the landmines case and it represents a moral prohibition regime. In the cluster munitions ban case, few states were as progressive as NGOs. The ban was brought to fruition by the exceptional combination of state and non-state activism, a new form of diplomacy for the 21st century, and the commanding moral force of international humanitarian law (IHL) as a robust and compelling previously existing normative structure. Clearly, the Convention that banned cluster bombs went beyond IHL but benefited from this powerful normative framework. Demonstrators at the May 2008 Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions Demonstrators at the May 2008 Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions The ban of cluster bombs is about military doctrines succumbing to the higher authority of moral and humanitarian concerns. In 1997, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), led by Nobel Peace Laureate chief negotiator Jody Williams, leading civil society worldwide, successfully banned antipersonnel landmines with the Ottawa Treaty. Yet once again, another set of weapons, namely cluster munitions, has gained prominence on the international agenda. Jody Williams, said upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize: the landmine does not recognize the peace, after the war is over, it keeps on killing. Cluster munitions also present the same indiscriminate elements with the same ‘unnecessary suffering' component to civilian populations. In summer 2006, the world watched in dismay, the brief but devastating war between Israel and Hezbollah when the Israeli army fired as many as four million cluster bombs into Lebanese territory during the short-lived war. Unfortunately, de-mining experts say, up to 1 million cluster bombs failed to explode immediately and continue to threaten civilians. Although the war ended in a month, Lebanese citizens continue to live in fear of leftover munitions; unexploded cluster bomb remnants that remain scattered across the country. Due to anti-personal characteristic of cluster munitions, which often leaves children as victims, advocates for banning the weapons created a united voice. The international outcry for the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of deploying these weapons in densely populated areas, in the summer 2006, helped spark the global movement to ban cluster munitions and to create a global prohibition regime. Some of the other serious precedent situations include during the Cold War, Laos, most prominently. After the end of the Cold War Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Kosovo, and the EthiopiaEritrea conflict were some of the most notable cases. It is important to notice that the process towards a ban is more than a century old. However the focus of this article will be since the summer 2006. What happened then in Lebanon constituted the shock event that triggered all the action for global prohibition treaty-making. I use primarily the framework of the illuminating theory of global prohibition regimes to start explaining how this has happened. The ban process started with the creation of the "Oslo Process", a track-two diplomacy course of action, i.e. with the government of Norway's call to negotiate a ban on clusters outside the UN in November 2006. The Oslo Process started with 46 states who committed to begin negotiations in February 2007 towards creating an international instrument to ban the use of cluster munitions (Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, 2008). Over the following year and a half, several conferences around the world were held to continue to craft the prohibition regime on banning cluster munitions. Three months after Oslo, states met again in Lima in May 2007, and again in Vienna in December. Discussions were held to work towards creating a treaty, with negotiations that spanned from specific definitions of cluster munitions to the extent of the assistance to victims. By February 2008, states met in New Zealand reaching an agreement known as the Wellington Declaration. This was a commitment by states to attend the Dublin conference three months later, setting final negotiations for a treaty to ban cluster munitions. The conference in Dublin lasted 10 days in May 2008 resulting in 107 states that signed and decided upon a final treaty.

#### Campbell flows neg. Pessimism falls into a violent trap that cannot overcome their own harms.

1AC Campbell ’19 — Horace; Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. He is the author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya. April 9, 2019; “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis”; *CounterPunch*; <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/>; //CYang//-ekh-

While the energies of many are focused on the issues of electoral politics, progressives must remain alert to new false flag operations of NATO. We are in a revolutionary moment and revolutionaries **cannot be pessimistic.** There are three important tasks: dismantle NATO, fight imperialism, racism, and white supremacy globally and be at the forefront for social justice and solidarity in all parts of the world.

### Rememory

#### The USFG should increase security cooperation with NATO in cybersecurity

David A. Deptula et.al , Marc R. Devore, Emma Salisbury, Michael Hunzeker 22, 3-16-2022, "6 Things NATO Can Do to Help Ukraine Right Now," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/16/nato-ukraine-support-russia-war-help-ideas/

Facilitate civilian cyber activities. Civilian hacking groups, including Anonymous, have already begun independently targeting Russia and Belarus by crashing government websites, leaking classified documents, and hacking state-run media outlets. These grassroot cyberattacks are certainly eye-catching. Yet they are unlikely to fundamentally blunt Russia’s war effort, if only because they are being executed by a loose-knit community of cyber activists that possess high levels of technical skills but lack the contextual knowledge to maximize the damage of their efforts. NATO can help fill this gap by finding ways to “guide from behind” to coordinate what will otherwise amount to a series of disparate and uncoordinated attacks. Russia takes this approach to an extreme by employing private actors as cyber auxiliaries. During their 2007 distributed denial-of-service attacks on Estonia, Russian intelligence agencies provided software and guidance to ordinary citizens or “patriotic hackers” who wanted to punish Estonia for removing a World War II-era statue memorializing the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany. NATO should take a different approach. Because many hackers—especially those affiliated with groups like Anonymous—are deeply distrustful of government authority, NATO should not recruit cyber activists to work for U.S. or European government agencies. Instead, NATO should adopt a hands-off approach that maximizes plausible deniability and avoids antagonizing hackers who harbor anti-government sentiments. Rather than hire hackers and direct their operations, NATO can suggest cyber objectives that just so happen to be of particular strategic importance. For example, NATO cyberunits could set up front organizations that identify lesser-known Russian government agencies, Russian companies that produce military components, and organizations that are known fronts for Russian cyber efforts. More controversially, NATO could also facilitate knowledge transfers by finding creative ways to leak bits of code or zero-day exploits that can help hackers engineer attacks on Russian networks. NATO member states should also begin to consider ways to protect hackers operating on their territory from legal liability and prosecution by Russia and its allies.a.

#### a. Helping Ukraine fight back against Russia stop’s the spread of colonialism

Timothy Snyder 22, 4-28-2022, "The War in Ukraine Is a Colonial War," New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-colonial-war

When Vladimir Putin denies the reality of the Ukrainian state, he is speaking the familiar language of empire. For five hundred years, European conquerors called the societies that they encountered “tribes,” treating them as incapable of governing themselves. As we see in the ruins of Ukrainian cities, and in the Russian practice of mass killing, rape, and deportation, the claim that a nation does not exist is the rhetorical preparation for destroying it. Empire’s story divides subjects from objects. As the philosopher Frantz Fanon argued, colonizers see themselves as actors with purpose, and the colonized as instruments to realize the imperial vision. Putin took a pronounced colonial turn when returning to the Presidency a decade ago. In 2012, he described Russia as a “state-civilization,” which by its nature absorbed smaller cultures such as Ukraine’s. The next year, he claimed that Russians and Ukrainians were joined in “spiritual unity.” In a long essay on “historical unity,” published last July, he argued that Ukraine and Russia were a single country, bound by a shared origin. His vision is of a broken world that must be restored through violence. Russia becomes itself only by annihilating Ukraine. As the objects of this rhetoric, and of the war of destruction that it sanctions, Ukrainians grasp all of this. Ukraine does have a history, of course, and Ukrainians do constitute a nation. But empire enforces objectification on the periphery and amnesia at the center. Thus modern Russian imperialism includes memory laws that forbid serious discussion of the Soviet past. It is illegal for Russians to apply the word “war” to the invasion of Ukraine. It is also illegal to say that Stalin began the Second World War as Hitler’s ally, and used much the same justification to attack Poland as Putin is using to attack Ukraine. When the invasion began, in February, Russian publishers were ordered to purge mentions of Ukraine from textbooks. Faced with the Kremlin’s official mixture of fantasy and taboo, the temptation is to prove the opposite: that it is Ukraine rather than Russia that is eternal, that it is Ukrainians, not Russians, who are always right, and so on. Yet Ukrainian history gives us something more interesting than a mere counter-narrative to empire. We can find Ukrainian national feeling at a very early date. In contemporary Ukraine, though, the nation is not so much anti-colonial, a rejection of a particular imperial power, as post-colonial, the creation of something new.

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by developing an Arctic strategy sensitive to the rights of indigenous peoples.

#### A NATO comprehensive Arctic strategy disrupts the epistemic colonial drive and includes consideration of indigenous well-being.

**Danoy 20** (Jim Danoy, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Set NATO’s sights on the High North”, Atlantic Council, 10/14/20, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/set-natos-sights-on-the-high-north/>) // EL

A strategy for defense and deterrence in warming waters

While these developments may seem far away and far off to many NATO allies, a Russian A2/AD bubble along the Alliance’s northern flank should be a critical concern for an Alliance with an obligation to defend its Arctic member states. That different Arctic allies have different views on the role NATO should play makes a consensus approach difficult.7 Nevertheless, the absence of an overarching security concept for the Arctic is an obvious and increasingly urgent lacuna for the Alliance. NATO’s Article 5 requirement for collective defense makes it imperative that it take a more active role in confronting actions that jeopardize its ability to protect its member states.

To that end, NATO should develop a comprehensive Arctic strategy that is focused on deterrence of competitors and defense of its member states. This strategy should be one that is sensitive to and accounts for the diverse array of unique Arctic equities, such as environmental issues and the **rights of indigenous peoples**. Such a strategy would have military, political, and environmental components and should detail approaches for establishing and maintaining a concept for credible deterrence in the Arctic. In the military dimension, specifically, the Alliance should undertake a number of actions to advance the following priorities:

Build political consensus. As recommended in 2017 by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Political Committee, in order to address Arctic security matters, NATO should establish an Arctic Working Group to settle disagreements on the Alliance’s role in the Arctic. It might also sponsor an Arctic Security Forum for Arctic stakeholders both inside and outside government.

Enhance domain awareness. Increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in the North Atlantic and establishing mechanisms to enhance information sharing on Arctic matters is both necessary and noncontroversial.

Ensure allies can operate effectively and jointly. There are several avenues for building Arctic competency and interoperability. These include:

Conducting a feasibility study on the utility of establishing a NATO Joint Force Command for the Arctic or Arctic Command to coordinate NATO military operations in the Arctic region;

Establishing a specialized NATO Arctic Rapid Reaction Force comprised of air, ground, and maritime assets from Canada, Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and others capable of responding to both military and humanitarian crises in the region;

Increasing the frequency and complexity of NATO military exercises, such as Trident Juncture 2018, in the region; and

Focusing on polar icebreaker capabilities and encouraging Arctic allies to build additional icebreakers to address Russia’s large numerical advantage and China’s in-progress icebreaker program.

Maintain stability. Establishing an Arctic security dialogue with Russia through the NATO-Russia Council will promote transparency about NATO’s actions in the Arctic and mitigate adverse reactions. Such a dialogue could explore the development of a “military code of conduct” for the Arctic with the goal of reducing the risk of confrontation or miscalculation. This could include advance notification of military exercises as well as routine air and naval activity, in addition to protocols for respecting the region’s biodiversity.

Finding a credible voice

An effective defense and deterrence posture for the Arctic must draw on successful approaches and activities in NATO’s east and south while accounting for the Arctic’s unique, historic disassociation from security issues. To be an accepted and credible actor in the Arctic, NATO must utilize both its political and military tools. It must serve as a bridge between the security community and an array of longstanding Arctic stakeholders which have a vested interest in promoting regional stability and prosperity. For instance, NATO’s credibility will be strengthened by **acknowledging the Arctic strategies of indigenous groups** and by incorporating their insights on regional trends, including their ideas on habitation and presence that are conducive to longevity.8 NATO must equally account for the importance of efforts such as environmental protection, scientific exploration, and natural resource development.

Even as the changing security environment necessitates ramping up NATO’s role in the Arctic, the Alliance must also respect the unique set of existing Arctic consultative fora, which serve productive purposes and where NATO’s presence would be counterproductive and antithetical to the purpose of keeping Russia, and occasionally China, constructively engaged. Nevertheless, the eventual establishment of a formal Arctic Security Forum where NATO as an institution is an accepted actor should be a long-term goal. To that end, NATO should encourage the development of these talks through a forum such as the Arctic Security Roundtable, held annually at the Munich Security Conference through joint efforts by the Wilson Center and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). This off-the-record, high-level setting includes China and could be utilized to facilitate a candid Arctic security dialogue geared toward the establishment of a formal security forum.

Overall, the growing military-security dimension in Arctic affairs requires NATO to urgently shore up its defense and deterrence posture in the region lest it risk losing relevance and the ability to protect its members. NATO’s recent agreement to establish operational coordination mechanisms between NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the Danish Joint Arctic Command (JACO), which has responsibility for the defense of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, is a step in the right direction.9 But moving forward comprehensively will require the Alliance to navigate the complex and politically sensitive interlocking relationships among existing Arctic stakeholders. To do this successfully, NATO needs a carefully planned Arctic strategy that can forge consensus among Arctic allies around specific military activities that guarantee access to the region in any circumstance. The time is now for NATO to be an Arctic actor.

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on ethical principles to ensure human control in artificial intelligence systems.

#### This disrupts the epistemic colonial drive and forces a reevaluation of ethics at the expense of security

Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” [https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots#](https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots) Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Due to their lack of emotion and legal and ethical judgment, fully autonomous weapons would face significant obstacles in complying with the principles of humanity. Those principles require the humane treatment of others and respect for human life and human dignity. Humans are motivated to treat each other humanely because they feel compassion and empathy for their fellow humans. Legal and ethical judgment gives people the means to minimize harm; it enables them to make considered decisions based on an understanding of a particular context. As machines, fully autonomous weapons would not be sentient beings capable of feeling compassion. Rather than exercising judgment, such weapons systems would base their actions on pre-programmed algorithms, which do not work well in complex and unpredictable situations. Showing respect for human life entails minimizing killing. Legal and ethical judgment helps humans weigh different factors to prevent arbitrary and unjustified loss of life in armed conflict and beyond. It would be difficult to recreate such judgment, developed over both human history and an individual life, in fully autonomous weapons, and they could not be pre-programmed to deal with every possible scenario in accordance with accepted legal and ethical norms. Furthermore, most humans possess an innate resistance to killing that is based on their understanding of the impact of loss of life, which fully autonomous weapons, as inanimate machines, could not share. Even if fully autonomous weapons could adequately protect human life, they would be incapable of respecting human dignity. Unlike humans, these robots would be unable to appreciate fully the value of a human life and the significance of its loss. They would make life-and-death decisions based on algorithms, reducing their human targets to objects. Fully autonomous weapons would thus violate the principles of humanity on all fronts.

### Warren

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by banning lethal autonomous weapons

#### LAWs solves their offense

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Drones as Techno-Legal Assemblages

This section gives an account of drones as techno-legal assemblages. It argues that the drone assemblage implements remote techniques of social control, and these techniques reflect the broader history of colonial warfare. The technological character of law allows the US to use it for the efficient ordering of the space of drone wars. Drone wars map onto colonial cartographies and position the subjects of killing as legitimate targets without legal protection. Thus, drone strikes are not a radical break from the past but are grounded in the history of colonial war and necropolitics.

An assemblage is ‘a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them’.100 These terms include both material aspects, such as the technological practices of the drone, and formal aspects of language, such as legal terms. Deleuze states that assemblages consist of an interaction between content and form, where ‘form’ refers to expressions or utterances, and ‘content’ refers to what the expression is combined with, or the material aspects of the assemblage.101

Drone scholars have generally conceived of the drone as a surveillance assemblage.102 These scholars draw on the work of Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson, who emphasise the way modern surveillance works by ‘abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows’ to be ‘reassembled into distinct “data doubles” ’.103 The drone as a surveillance assemblage fits into what scholars have identified as the ‘racialised surveillant assemblage’, an assemblage that identifies bodies as ‘terrorists’ using racialised logics.104 Joseph Pugliese notes that surveillance data is coded with bioinformational categories such as skin colour, ethnicity, gender, height and weight.105 These are coded by the Department of Defense’s screening systems, inserting predetermined categories into the data.106 The Department combines its coded information with uncoded (or not-yet-coded) metadata collected by the National Security Agency, to form a ‘categorical hybridization across different disciplines’.107 This hybrid of ‘soft biometric’ information and hard metadata merges the biological into the algorithmic and results in a form of ‘bioinformational stereotyping’.108 While Pugliese’s work focuses on articulating what can count as a victim of military violence, his delineation of categorical hybridisation in the drone assemblage is useful for this paper’s focus on the enmeshing of law and technology, since it connects technical processes to legal thresholds.

Under the influence of the drone assemblage, drone wars become what Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould call ‘liquid war’.109 Liquid wars occur across vast and discontinuous stretches of space, concerning a theatre of war that is moving and moveable, and involve a disparate set of entities.110 In this context, the mechanisms of biopolitical control of whole populations become less effective than modular and remote forms of control.111 These are the forms of control that Deleuze describes as making up societies of control.112 For Deleuze, these are methods that are more concerned with information than with individuals.113 Rather than locating individuals within a mass, these methods treat individuals as ‘dividuals’, breaking them down into information that can be used in a piecemeal fashion to achieve changing purposes.114

#### Drones topic education good

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Paul Kahn has argued that drone war ‘no longer looks like war’.115 Kahn’s conception of what war looks like involves sovereign states engaging in combat with their regular armed forces using methods that involve mutual risk.116 Since drone wars are not waged against other territorially bound sovereign states, or against a group resembling armed forces, and without mutual risk, Kahn places drone wars in a zone of exception that is neither regulated by normal law nor ordered by the laws of war. 117 However, drone wars as asymmetrical conflicts against non-sovereign groups are not a ‘new form of violence’.118 Rather, as Samuel Moyn observes, they are a successor to colonial warfare.119 Taking a broader perspective heeds the call of Deleuze, for whom ‘the machines don’t explain anything, you have to analyze the collective apparatuses of which the machines are just one component’.120 What separates drone wars from prior conflicts is not, Moyn argues, the technology itself, or who uses it against whom, but rather the place of the law.121 Before 1977, he notes, the laws of war did not apply to insurgents, while today they are ‘highly legalized’.122 Drones are part of a larger trajectory in which the laws of war apply to more subjects, in more spaces, rather than fewer.

Ioannis Kalpouzos notes that lawyers are involved ‘in decision making at different levels and stages of the targeting process’.123 Military lawyers based at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center are part of a plethora of individuals who watch the drone and provide advice.124 These lawyers are called on to dispense immediate advice: ‘target prosecutions must be completed in a matter of minutes.’125 They also provide policies and ‘provide training products so aircrews and (joint terminal attack controllers) are prepared to operate rapidly’.126 The place of lawyers in the drone assemblage highlights what David Kennedy calls the ‘war-generative functions of law’: the military ‘turns to law to discipline the troops, to justify, excuse, and privilege battlefield violence, to build the institutional and logistical framework from which to launch the spear’.127 In 2011, a single drone required up to 185 personnel to operate128 across different bases and continents—an operation that resembles the complexity of an aircraft carrier, ‘requiring a complex and entrenched culture of standard practices and shared experiences, of rules and discipline’.129 Drone operations are so specialised that they are producing new forms of legal expertise.130

This insertion of the law into the kill chain encloses what might otherwise be extrajudicial killing in a cloak of lawfulness. Giorgio Agamben notes that the law includes ‘what is simultaneously pushed outside’,131 and others acknowledge this expanding character of the law to cover more subjects and things that are outside itself.132 The vision of legal experts doing ondemand technical work to grease the wheels of the kill chain also echoes Carl Schmitt’s image of the state as a technical machine.133 The state, on this conception, is analogous to a sophisticated machine in which all parts work according to order. This was required of the state, for Schmitt, to guard against the state of nature.134 To succeed, the state needs to be an efficient instrument that can exercise the utmost control, which requires it to be neutral of all norms and technically perfect.135 The drone assemblage, tangled with legalities, reflects this picture of the law as pervasive, technical, efficient and neutral. However, for Schmitt, the technical machine only encompassed the state and ordered its interior, not its exterior.136 Law’s expanding trajectory indicates that its technical pervasiveness goes beyond what Schmitt imagined.

The pervasive, expanding, technical character of the law reveals law as technology. Technology, too, has been viewed by some as all-pervasive, even reaching mythical status.137 For Martin Heidegger, the essence of technology is a way of understanding the world as something to be calculated, ordered and manipulated.138 This technological worldview sees everything as ‘readyto-hand’,139 everything as some tool for using to achieve some purpose. All things, in this view, become merely some resource that can be replaced and exchanged.140 The paradigm example, for Heidegger, is modern industrialised technology, which draws all resources into supply chains to further the aims of economic efficiency.141 Law, too, is ‘ready-to-hand’, a set of rules to achieve whatever purpose most efficiently.142 But law itself is also technological, as a worldview that sees everything as a resource to be ordered to further the aim of technical efficiency. Heidegger calls this pervasive technological worldview ‘enframing’.143 Thinking of law as technology emphasises the pervasiveness of law, that it results in a closed hermeneutic that purports, like technology, to be able to order everything, to govern everything, and this pervasiveness is also at work through the drone. We can see the expansion of the laws of war to technically govern the subjects of drone strikes in the development of targeted killing.

However, this one form of control forms part of a greater collective of control assemblages. Kalpouzos144 identifies it as part of what Marianna Valverde and Michael Mopas call ‘targeted governance’—‘linked to the idea of efficient, apolitical, knowledge-driven, “evidence-based” policy’.145 This links targeted killing to ideas of law and control. Law as efficient and calculative is woven into the kill chain to make assessments of proportionality and distinction on demand. Control as targeted echoes the mechanisms of the society of control, converting individuals into the dividuals of signatures and patterns of life. This form of legalised killing developed in the 1990s before the armed drone existed, indicating it is part of a broader trajectory of law, though the drone became the cypher for the law of war’s new justification of lethal forms of control.146

The development of targeted killing follows the trajectory of colonial warfare that flows through the drone. Kahn and other scholars are preoccupied with anxiety over the ‘vanishing battlefield’,147 the transformation of war that ‘no longer looks like war’,148 the creation of a space of exception where neither peacetime law nor the laws of war apply. This preoccupation is influenced by a ‘territorialist epistemology’.149 This perspective privileges the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and the imagined idea that international law is built to facilitate interactions between sovereign states of equal standing.150 It fails to recognise the ‘differentiated sovereignty’ that developed in international law to suppress and manage the non-European world.151 The use of drones in war maps onto ‘imperial cartographies’, revealing this form of legitimised violence as a continuation of the imperial logic of international law.152 Campbell Munro notes that drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia do not occur across the entire territory of these states, but are localised to areas on the ‘imperial periphery’, regions of historically contested sovereign borders that are administered as less than sovereign.153 According to Munro, the legitimation of violence in drone wars continues at least three lines of imperial legal reasoning.154 One sees the Eurocentric laws of war as applying only between sovereign states, which the colonial other was not: ‘[t]o characterize any conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the laws of nations, only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject.’155 This logic continues in the concept of targeted killing, which allows the subject of drone strikes to be a legitimate target, but does not offer them legal protection. Another line of imperial legal reasoning sees the reinscription of ‘differentiated and layered sovereignties’ insofar as the areas targeted coincide with the imperial periphery.156 The third line of reasoning sees mechanised war equated with legitimate war, as embodied in the technoscientific practices of the drone.157

The three extensions of imperial legal reasoning mentioned above characterise a necropolitical space of legal ambiguity. Achille Mbembe writes that in the colony, ‘ “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war without end” ’.158 This is due, he insists, to ‘the creation of a European juridical order’ in which states are equal and cannot rule outside their own borders.159 This turnsthe colony, outside European state borders, into a zone of indistinction, where states need not follow any law of equality, including the laws of war.160 Laws do make their way into the colony, but are premised on the idea that the colony is not sovereign, so the laws are imposed by its European occupier, and on the idea that the people are not fully legal subjects, so they may belong to others as slaves but have no rights themselves.161 Thus, the colony is an ambiguously lawful place where a colonising power combines laws and unlawfulness to dominate the racially distinguished ‘others’. This necropolitical logic is at work in drone wars, in the way that targets are racially distinguished, legally killable but not legally protected, and managed under a regime of differentiated sovereignty. The entire collective of apparatuses of which the drone is a part makes drone wars spaces of legal ambiguity. Thus, the US continues to follow the necropolitical logic of colonial expansion to justify its killing.

The laws of war, considered from the standpoint of enframing, order and are ordered by the imperial logic of international law. Within this picture, the drone is a cypher for the laws of war as part of a collective of assemblages of control. Far from representing a break from old forms of warfare with their imagined European chivalrous legality, drones continue the project of colonial warfare by legitimising violence using the law. The extension of legality to the subjects of drone strikes is another mechanism in the technical machine that is the law of progress, order, efficiency and neutrality. The ambiguous (non-) distinction between targets, the legal ambiguity of differentiated sovereignty and targeted killing, and the blurring of the boundary between peace and war are individual aspects of collective assemblages of control that are part of a continuum of the law, not a radical break from it. This picture of the inescapability of the law echoes so many dystopian visions, including Deleuze’s and Guattari’s vision of a universal computer that tracks every movement and may decide at any moment not to allow someone access to parts of the city.162 They issued a warning about the societies of control, insisting that their mechanisms amount to the ‘coils of a serpent’.163 The drone assemblage is one of them.

#### LAWs exacerbate racial inequalities due to biased programing

Ramsay-Jones 19 – Hayley Ramsay-Jones, Soka Gakkai International, member of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, October 17, 2019, “Racism and Fully Autonomous Weapons UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, workshop on the impact of new information technologies on racial equality, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Racism/SR/Call/campaigntostopkillerrobots.pdf

Fully autonomous weapons can select and attack targets without meaningful human control, they operate based on algorithms and data analysis programming. In essence, this means that machines would have the power to make life-and-death decisions over human beings. The trend towards more autonomy in weaponry without adequate human oversight is alarming especially when we know that digital technologies are not racially neutral. Moreover, when it comes to artificial intelligence (AI) there is an increasing body of evidence that shows that racism operates at every level of the design process and continues to emerge in the production, implementation, distribution and regulation. In this regard AI not only embodies the values and beliefs of the society or individuals that produce them but acts to amplify these biases and the power disparities.iii One example of racism manifesting in AI is the under-representation problem in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields, which in itself is a manifestation of structural racism and patriarchy in western society. Technologies in the west are mostly 2 developed by white males, and thus perform better for this group. A 2010 studyiv by researchers at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the University of Texas, found that algorithms designed and tested in East Asia are better at recognizing East Asians, while those designed in Western countries are more accurate at detecting Caucasians. Similarly, sound detecting devices perform better at detecting male, Anglo-American voices and accents, as opposed to female voices, and non-Anglo-American accents. Research by Joy Buolamwini,v reveals that race, skin tone and gender are significant when it comes to facial recognition. Buolamwini demonstrates that facial recognition software recognizes male faces far more accurately than female faces, especially when these faces are white. For darker-skinned people however the error rates were over 19%, and unsurprisingly the systems performed especially badly when presented with the intersection between race and gender, evidenced by a 34.4% error margin when recognizing dark-skinned women. Despite the concerning error rates in these systems, commercially we already see adaptations of faulty facial recognition systems being rolled out in a variety of ways from soap dispensers to self-driving cars. The issue here is what happens if law enforcement and national security become reliant on a system that can recognize white males with just 1% error rate yet fails to recognize dark-skinned women more than one-third of the time? These types of applications of new information technology fail people of color intersectionally at a disturbing rate. The fact that these systems are commercially available reveals a blatant disregard for people of color, it also positions "whiteness"vi as the norm, the standard for objectivity and reason. These applications of new information technology including their weaponization favors whiteness at the expense of all others, it is not merely a disempowerment but an empowerment. In real terms, racism bolsters white people's life chances. Vii

#### AI is used in AFRICOM

Paul McCleary 18. Pentagon Correspondent at Breaking Defense. “Pentagon’s Big AI Program, Maven, Already Hunts Data in Middle East, Africa”. Breaking Defense. 5/1/18. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/05/pentagons-big-ai-program-maven-already-hunts-data-in-middle-east-africa/

Just a year after its birth, the Pentagon’s cornerstone artificial intelligence effort, Project Maven, has already been deployed to half a dozen locations in the Middle East and Africa, where it is helping military analysts sort through the mountains of data their sensors and drones soak up.

Military leaders have said for months that the program was being used to organize and analyze video and data pulled from drones in the Middle East. But its early success and the push from Washington to move out on AI as quickly as possible has led the Pentagon to expand to AFRICOM, one military official involved in the program said on Tuesday.

“We’re in five or six locations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM,” Lt. Col. Garry Floyd said at a technology conference in Washington. The AI program is working on data pulled in from small ScanEagle drones in Iraq, and there are plans to move to small, tactical drones as well as larger Predator and Reaper drones later this year.

“Data is like iron ore, there’s mountains of it,” Floyd said, adding that the key is shaping it and understanding it, something that the Maven team is working to train the code to do.

While public acknowledgement of the Africom deployment is new, Floyd said the Maven technology has been in use there since December, where early on the team was able to update the algorithm about six times in five days.

That flexibility is exactly what the Pentagon is looking for. The military is full of horror stories about clunky and slow technology that drive users up the wall. But, Floyd said, there’s literally a button on the Maven interface that can help with that.

The button simply says “Train AI.” This allows for the retraining and improvement of the algorithm, and it’s a critical piece of the system. “It’s not all that different, if you think about it, than a young airman,” Floyd said. “On their first day of work it’s going to take them a little while to understand what’s going on, to understand the mission.” It’s the same with machine learning.

There is no such thing as perfect technology, and AI is no different, but the Maven team is trying to make that a feature, rather than a bug.

“With AI, if you give that airman in the field an 80 percent capability, and a good user guide,” both the user and the tech have room to grow, Floyd said. “You want to give them ability to improve it on the fly, and we’re inventing some of those processes to do that. You deploy something that’s not 100 percent, you know that on day one you’re going to retrain it, and then you go from there.”

In order to do that, the system needs to remain relatively open and available to accept rapid and frequent upgrades from a variety of sources. Proprietary approaches to deploying data aren’t going to work anymore, as threats and opportunities change too rapidly not to plug in upgrades on the move.

“We need to be able to plug algorithms in and take them out. We need algorithms from different sources,” he said. “We need to be able to use algorithms that the soldiers and airmen are going to develop themselves. Open needs to be the standard and the expectation.”

The ultimate aim of the program isn’t to build an all-seeing Skynet-type capability, military officials insist. The Pentagon has been careful to keep their distance from talk of autonomous weapons, or calling for completely autonomous surveillance systems that can do everything on their own. “We don’t see [technology] as replacing the airmen, we’re trying to free up time for allowing them to focus on other tasks. We don’t want them to have to stare and count anymore,” Floyd said.

The enthusiasm for Maven, and its rapid deployments, have come at a cost, however. Earlier this year, the project made a big splash after 3,100 Google employees signed a letter protesting their company’s involvement in the program. Google execs were quick to assure its unhappy engineers that the company would never participate in building weapons, but the episode exposed the deep cultural divide between Silicon Valley wunderkinds and the US military.

Pushing back slightly, Floyd said that “I think what you’ll see is there will be those who will partner with us and will help us do the things that we need to do to be successful. Because success revolves around accomplishing the mission rapidly so we can all come home safe and so that we keep collateral damage to a minimum.”

Several representatives from the defense industry told Floyd that they’re eager to help, even if the Googles of the world may not be as enthusiastic. But the cultural disconnect — which former defense chief Ash Carter tried to bridge with his DIUX offices plopped in the middle of tech hotbeds in California, Austin and Boston — is very real. Making it even more problematic, China and Russia face no such limitations. China, in particular, can simply order its tech firms to work on government projects.

Maven only kicked off in April 2017, when then-Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work established the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, which is overseen by the Defense Undersecretary for Intelligence (known as the USDI). The small team initially incorporated its AI tools into 10 sites, with plans to incorporate them into 30 sites by mid-2018, according to a new government assessment of the program.

Maven is also only one of hundreds of AI initiatives being pursued across the Pentagon. So many programs spread out over such a large organization can be the stuff of nightmares for military planners, but the building’s hard-charging new undersecretary for research and engineering, Michael Griffin, said recently that he is setting up a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center that will will tie together the military’s efforts with those of the Intelligence Community, allowing them to combine efforts in a breakneck push to move government’s AI initiatives forward.